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Abstract 
The paper examines the definitions of open default theories known from the literature. 
First it is shown that none of them is satisfactory either for formal or for intuitive reasons. 
Next a new approach is considered. It is free from the obvious deficiencies of the known 
definitions, but possesses their positive properties. 
1. Introduction 
One of the widely used nonmonotonic formalisms is Reiter’s default logic [HI. 
This logic deals with rules of inference called defaults which are expressions of the 
form 
6(x) = 
a(x) : MP, (4, . . . , W, (4 
Y(X) 7 
where a(x), PI(x), . . . , P,(x), Y(X), m 3 1, are formulas of the first-order 
predicate calculus whose free variables are among x =x1, . . . ,x,. A default is 
closed if none of (Y, PI, . . . , &, y contains a free variable. Otherwise a default is 
called open. The formula cy(x) is called the prerequisite of the default rule, the 
formulas PI(x) , . . . , p,(x) are called the justijications, and the formula y(x) is 
called the conclusion. Roughly speaking, the intuitive meaning of an open default 
is as follows. For every n-tuple of objects t = t,, . . . , t,,, if a(t) is believed, and the 
pi(t)% are consistent, then one is permitted to deduce -y(t). Thus an open default 
can be thought of as a kind of a “default scheme”, where the free variables x can 
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be replaced by any of the theory’s objects. Various examples of deduction by 
default rules can be found in [15]. 
Whereas closed defaults have been quite thoroughly investigated, very little is 
known about open ones. Moreover, there is no common attitude towards their 
meaning. However, interesting cases of default reasoning usually deal with open 
defaults, because the intended use of a default is to determine whether an object 
possesses a given property rather than accepting or rejecting a “fixed statement”. 
Three major approaches to the treatment of open defaults are known from the 
literature. The first one belongs to Reiter [El, where he gives explicit names to 
the theory objects by extending the theory language with new constants. Then 
Reiter treats an open default as a set of all its closed instances in the enriched 
language. The second approach is similar to the first one and belongs to Poole 
[14] who replaces an open default by the set of all its closed instances over the 
original language. The last approach is that of Lifschitz [9], where free variables 
in defaults are treated as object variables, rather than metavariables for the closed 
terms of the theory. 
In this paper we examine the above approaches from formal and intuitive 
points of view. Obviously, the most natural formal test for accepting a definition 
of an extension for an open default theory is that it must be equivalent to the 
original definition of Reiter, when applied to a closed default theory. However, 
this necessary condition is not sufficient, because equivalent definitions of 
extensions for closed default theories become different when one extends them to 
open default theories. Since there are no (and cannot be any) formal criteria for a 
sufficient condition, in order to choose the right definition we should rely on our 
imprecise intuition to tell us what we should expect from an extension for an open 
default theory. 
As the result of our analysis we argue that all Reiter’s, Poole’s and Lifschitz’s 
definitions are not entirely sound. In particular, Reiter’s definition that gives 
explicit names to implicitly defined objects is counterintuitive and also is not 
acceptable from a formal point of view, Poole’s definition that deals only with 
explicitly defined objects is too weak (yet it passes the formal test), and Lifschitz’s 
definition that treats explicitly defined objects as implicitly defined ones is not 
acceptable either for a formal or for an intuitive reason. However, Lifschitz’s 
definition seems to be more promising, and we propose a modification to 
Lifschitz’s definition which makes it free from its obvious deficiencies. The main 
feature of the modified definition is that it clearly separates between explicitly and 
implicitly defined theory objects. It also passes the formal test and its connection 
to circumscription is similar to the original one. 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we recall the definition of 
extensions for closed default theories, in Sections 3 and 4 we examine, respective- 
ly, Poole’s and Reiter’s definitions of extensions for open default theories, and in 
Section 5 we consider a possible modification to Reiter’s definition. Section 6 
contains a semantical definition of extensions for closed default theories, which is 
the starting point for Lifschitz’s and our approaches. In Section 7 we examine 
Lifschitz’s approach to open default theories, in Section 8 we present a modi- 
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fication to this approach which is more robust than the original, and in Section 9 
we show how extensions for default logic with fixed constants can be expressed in 
terms of the modified approach. In Section 10 we establish a relationship between 
the modified Lifschitz’s approach and circumscription. Finally, we end the paper 
with some concluding remarks. 
2. Closed default theories 
In this section we recall Reiter’s definition of extensions for closed default 
theories. This definition is frequently used in this paper as a formal criterion for 
accepting or rejecting definitions of extensions for open default theories. In 
particular, as was mentioned in the introduction, if we accept Reiter’s definition 
of extensions for closed default theories as a “right one”, then a “right” definition 
of extensions for open default theories, when applied to a closed default theory, 
must be equivalent to Reiter’s definition. 
Definition 1. A default theory is a pair (D, A), where D is a set of defaults and A 
is a set of first-order sentences (axioms). A default theory is called closed, if all its 
defaults are closed. Otherwise it is called open. 
Definition 2. Let (D, A) be a closed default theory. For any set of sentences S let 
q,,,,(S) = B, where B is the smallest set of sentences (beliefs) that satisfies the 
following three properties.’ 
(Dl) AcB. 
(D2) Th(B) = B, i.e., B is deductively closed. 
(D3) If u’Mpl,...,MPm~D, aEB, and -&,...,1/3,,,$S, then yEB. 
A set of senten:es E is an extension for (D, A) if T;,,,,(E) = E, i.e., if E is a 
fixed point of the operator qD,A). 
All the examples, but one, we consider in this paper deal with the simplest and 
very intuitive case of defaults of the form w which are called normal defaults 
without prerequisites. We shall need the following lemma. 
Lemma 3. Let D be a set of closed normal defaults without prerequisites. Then a 
set of sentences is a consistent extension for (D, A) if and only if it is a maximal 
consistent set of sentences of the form Th(A U A’), where A’ C {p: $@ E D}. 
Proof. The “if” part of the lemma is, actually, [14, Theorem 4.11 restricted to 
closed defaults. 
I This definition follows [9] and differs from the original one in [15] in introducing the notation 
I;,,,,(S) = B. This notation is more convenient for a technical reason. 
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For the “only if” part, let E be an extension for (D, A), and let A, = E fl 
{p: +@ ED}. Th en, by [15, Theorem 2.51, E = Th(A U A,). 
It remains to show that Th(A U A by) (=E) is a maximal consistent set of 
sentences of the form Th(A U A’), where A’ C {p: 9 E D}. Assume to the 
contrary that this is not the case. and let Th(A U A’), where A’ C {j?: 9 E D}, 
be a maximal consistent set of sentences containing E as a proper subset. By the 
“if” part of the lemma, Th(A U A’) is an extension for (D, A), in contradiction 
with the Minim&y of Extensions [15, Theorem 2.41. 0 
3. Poole’s definition of open default theories 
In this section we analyze Poole’s definition of open default theories. Even 
though, this definition was introduced eight years later than Reiter’s one, it is 
discussed first for a methodological reason. For both Poole’s and Reiter’s 
approaches we need the following definition. 
Definition 4. A. (closed) instance of an open default 6(x) = u(X) ’ MBl’“,:x;- ’ MP&) is 
a closed default S(t) = a(t) ’MP~(:);tJ. MP&) . where t = t,, . , t, is a tuple of closed 
(or ground) terms of the underlying language L. For an open default 6, the set of 
all closed instances of 6 is denoted by 6, and for a set of defaults D, d = U,,, 8 
is the set of all closed instances of all defaults of D. 
In [14] Poole deals with normal defaults without prerequisites only, and treats 
an open default theory (D, A) as a closed default theory (0, A). 
Note that if all defaults from D are closed, then D = D. Therefore Poole’s 
definition when applied to closed default theories is equivalent to Reiter’s original 
definition. However Example 5 below’ shows that Poole’s approach which deals 
only with explicitly defined theory individuals, is too weak. 
Example 5. Let (D, A) be a default theory, where D = {w}, and A = 
{ilxQ(x)}. Intuitively, one would expect of an implicitly defined individual 
satisfying Q that it satisfy P in the extension for this theory. That is, one would 
expect of 3x(P(x) A Q(x)) to belong to the extension. However, since b = 0, 
(D, A) has a unique Poole extension E = A. 
4. Reiter’s definition of open default theories 
In [15] Reiter suggests an interpretation of an open default as the collection of 
all closed defaults of the form 6(t) = EC’) ’ MP1(ly);l;. . MP& , where t = t, , . . . , t, is a 
‘The example is similar to that of Reiter [IS. pp. IIS-1161, see Example 6 in the next section 
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tuple of the theory individuals. However, this interpretation depends on an 
explicit representation of the objects under consideration, or, in other words, it 
depends on the underlying language. As has been pointed out in [15], when 
dealing with open default theories, the main problem is to specify their in- 
dividuals. Reiter motivates his approach to that problem by the following 
examples. 
Example 6 [ 15, pp. 115-1161. Consider an open default theory (D, A), where D 
consists of only one default w and A contains two axioms 3xQ(x) and +‘(a). 
This theory contains an explicitly named individual a together with an implicitly 
defined individual that satisfies Q. Reiter suggests that the implicitly defined 
individual would satisfy P in the extension for (D, A). For this reason he 
introduced a new constant symbol c and replaced &Q(x) by Q(c). This 
immediately yields P(c) in the extension, which implies that 3x(Q(x) A P(x)) is 
also in the extension. 
The next example deals with the case in which implicitly defined individuals are 
introduced by default. 
Example 7 [ 15, p. 1161. Consider an open default theory (D, A), where D consists 
of two defaults 
: M3xP(x) : Me(x) 
&P(x) ’ Q(x) ’ 
and A is empty. In this theory there is an implicitly defined individual which is 
introduced by the first default, and which satisfies P. One would expect, by the 
second default, that this individual would also satisfy Q, i.e., one would expect 
3x(P(x) A Q(x)) to be in the extension. As in Example 6, Reiter introduces a new 
constant symbol c to denote this individual, and replaces the first default by 
w. This immediately yields P(c) in the extension and then, by the second 
default, Q(c) in the extension, and hence so is 3x(P(x) A Q(x)). 
In view of these examples, when dealing with open default theories, Reiter 
explicitly describes the theory objects by giving names to individuals by the means 
of Sk&em functions. For this purpose, he replaces the set of axioms A by its 
Skolemization, and interprets an open default by the set of closed instances of its 
Skolemized form, see the definitions below. 
The Skofemized form of a formula 4 is obtained as follows [16]. First put 4 in 
prenex normal form 4’. Then replace each existentially quantified variable x of 4’ 
by f(x,-. . . ,x,,), where each xi, i = 1, . . . , n, is either a free variable of +‘, or is 
bound by the universal quantifier preceding 3x in the prefix of +‘, and f is a new 
function symbol distinct from any in the language L and distinct from any other 
such function symbols previously introduced. Do this for all existentially quan- 
tified variables of 4. The result of the above transformation is a formula 4’ 
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without existential quantifiers and with the same free variables. Deleting all of 
4”s quantifiers results in a quantifier-free formula c#J’, called the Skolemization of 
4. The language L extended with the new function symbols will be denoted by L’. 
For his definition of an extension for an open default theory Reiter also needs 
the notion of the Skofemized form of a default. The Skolemized form of 
a(x) = Z!rcX) Mfl~(Xy;r. Mflwt(x) , denoted (a(x))‘, is a default that results from 6(x) by 
replacing its conclusion y(x) by (-y(x))‘. That is, 
Notice that the “top part” of a default remains unchanged in converting it to its 
Skolemized form. 
Finally, for a set of formulas A we define the Skolemizution of A, denoted by 
A”. by AS = { 4”: C#J E A}, for a set of defaults D we define the Skolemization of 
D, denoted by Ds, by Ds = (6 ‘: 6 E D}, and the Skolemization of a default 
theory (D, A), denoted (D, A)S, is defined by (D, A)S = (D’, A’).” 
Definition 8. Let (D, A) be an open default theory. A set of sentences E is an 
extension for (D, A) if and only if it is an extension for the closed default theory 
(0’. AS). 
Note that an extension is a set of sentences over the language L’. Therefore, 
when applied to a closed default theory, Definition 4 differs from Reiter’s original 
definition (Definition 2). In [15] Reiter suggests to overcome this problem by 
allowing to admit into extensions for closed default theories sentences over the 
language L’. 
The following examples indicate some shortcomings of Reiter’s definition. In 
particular, when applied to close default theories, it is not equivalent to Definition 
2. That is, Reiter’s definition of extensions for open default theories does not pass 
the formal test. 
Example 9. Let A , = {P(a)} and A z = {P(a), 3_&‘(x)}. Since P(u) ~&9’(x), 
Th(A ,) = Th(A2). Therefore closed default theories (0, A,) and (0, A*) have the 
same unique extension Th({P(u)}). On the other hand, the Skolemization of 
(0, A ,) is a closed default theory (0, {P(u)}), and the Skolemization of (0, AZ) is 
a closed default theory (0, {P(u), 3xP(x), P(c)}), where c is a new constant 
(O-place function symbol) introduced in the process of Skolemization of 3xP(x). 
Since without Skolem axioms (see Definition 12 in the next section) there is no 
way to deduce P(c) from P(u), (0, A,) and (0, A *), when considered as open 
default theories having different extensions. 
’ In general, the elements of A’ are not sentences. Therefore (D’, AS) does not satisfy Reiter’s 
definition of a default theory (Definition 1). However, it is not a problem at all, because AS can be 
equivalently replaced by A’ = {w’: w E A} 
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Example 10. Consider a closed default theory (D, A), where D contains two 
defaults 
: MP(a) : MlP(a) 
VxP(x) ’ lP(U) ' 
and A consists of only one axiom lP(b). The theory has a unique extension 
Th({+‘(a), +‘(b)}). H owever, its Skolemization which is an open default theory 
(D”, AS) = ({ : T;y), : f$;y)}, bP(b))) 
has two extensions, one of which contains lP(a) and the other contains P(u). 
An obvious reason for such a counterintuitive consequence of Reiter’s defini- 
tion is introducing the new free variable x by Skolemization of $$$ . In 
particular, in the definition of the Skolemized form of a default, it seems more 
natural to replace the conclusion y by 7’. 
Example 11.’ Consider a default theory (D, A), where D = {w} and A = 0. 
Intuitively, the default w expresses that P(x) is assumed to be false 
whenever possible,and we can expect that it will allow us to prove VxlP(x). But 
when passing to (D’, AS), all that this default gives us is the sentences lP(t) for 
the closed terms t of L’. 
In the next section we overcome the above illnesses of Reiter’s definition by 
extending A with Skofern axioms, and restricting the extensions for open default 
theories to St,>, where St, denotes the set of all sentences over L. 
5. A modification to Reiter’s definition of open default theories 
In this section we briefly discuss a version of Reiter’s approach proposed in [6]. 
Example 11 suggests that in order to interpret an open default as the set of its 
closed instances, we need the domain closure assumption. In [6] the domain of the 
theory individuals is completely described by means of Skolem functions. 
Definition 12. Let f be a mapping from the set of all formulas over a language L 
of the form 3x+ to a list of new function symbols f&. We assume that f is 
one-to-one and if 3x1,!@, , . . . ,x,,, x) has exactly it free variables xi,. . . ,xn, then 
f 3x+ is an n-place (Skolem) function symbol. We call the language L* obtained 
from L by extending the set of function symbols with {f&,} the Skolem expansion 
of L. The sentence 
4 This example is a simplified version of the example in [9]. 
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vx, . . -Vx,,(W(x,,. ,x,,,x)>$(x ,.“‘., X,,f~,&,~ ..,x,)>) 
is called a Skolem axiom. The set of all Skolem axioms is denoted by SK. 
Finally, for a first-order theory X over L, the Skolem expansion of X is a theory 
X* over L” defined by X* = X U SK. It is known that X* is a conservative 
expansion of’ X. i.e., for an L-sentence 4, X k 4 if and only if X* k 4, see 
[13, Theorem 11,38(iii)(c), p. 2131. 
Remark 13. Skolem expansions also admit the use of the following Carnap-like 
rule of inference. If X* 14(t) f or each closed term of L*, then X* 1 Vx+(x). 
(Note that the Carnap rule implies the domain closure assumption.) To show that 
the Carnap rule is admissible in Skolem expansions, assume to the contrary that 
X* 14(t) for each closed term of L*, but X* k Vx4(x). Therefore X” U 
{3x1$(x)} has a model. Then, by [6, Lemma 11, X* U {~~(f,,,,c,,)} also has a 
model, in contradiction with X* k 4(f,,_,,,,,). 
Definition 14. A set of sentences E is a modified Reiter extension for (D, A) if 
there exists an extension E* for (D, A*) such that E = E* fl St,.’ 
It was shown in [6, Theorem 31 that Definition 14, when restricted to closed 
default theories, is equivalent to the original definition of extension (Definition 
2). That is, a set of sentences E is an extension for a closed default theory (D, A) 
if and only if E is a modified Reiter extension for (II, A). 
Example 15. Let (U, A) be as in Example 11. That is, D = { ’ !Y$~~‘} and A = 0. 
By Lemma 3, extensions for (D, A*) are maximal consistent sets of sentences of 
the form Th(SK U A’), where A’ C {iP(t)} l,,C,jESt,_+. Since the set of sentences 
{VxlP(x)} is consistent, the set of sentences SK U {VxlP(x)} is also consistent. 
Therefore (0, A”) has a unique extension E* = Th(SK U {~P(t)}7P~,~EStL.). By 
the Carnap rule, VxlP(x) E E*. Thus, E* =Th(SKU {VxlP(x)}), and E* fl 
St,> = Th( {Vx+‘(x)}) IS a unique modified Reiter extension for (D, A). This 
extension fits the intuitive meaning of default w saying that P(x) is assumed 
to be false whenever possible. 
The following two examples demonstrate that the above modification to 
Reiter’s approach leads to undesirable consequences. 
Example 16.” Let D = {--A:*} and A = {P(a)}. Similarly to Example 1.5, one 
would expect the open default theory (D, A) to have a unique modified Reiter 
extension Th( {Vx(P(x) = x = a)} ). H owever, as it was shown by G. Schwarz, for 
every sentence 4 such that A U {3x17(x), 4) is consistent, (D, A) has a modified 
5 Note that SKI@ t 6’. Therefore thcrc is no need to convert defaults into Skolemized form. 
“The default theory in this example is that of the example of Lifschitz in [9]. 
M. Kaminski I ArtifTcial Intelligence 77 (1995) 285-319 293 
Reiter extension that contains 4. Thus, in particular, (D, A) has a modified Reiter 
extension that contains lVx(P(x) =x = a). Schwarz’s proof is as follows. 
By Definition 14, it suffices to show that (fi, A*) has an extension containing 
4. Let $ denote P(x) A 14. Then A* U {UP} is consistent. Indeed, let w be 
a model of A U {3x3’(x), c$}. Then for some u in the domain of w, w k lP(u). 
Since w b 4, w k 13x+. Therefore w can be extended to a model w* of 
A * U { 3xlP(x), 4}, by defining an assignment o Skolem functions in such a way 
that f2,+ is assigned u, see [l, proof of Proposition 3.3.1(i), p. 1641. 
By Lemma 3, there is an extension E* of (D, A*) such that lP(f&) E E*. By 
definition, both P(u) and 3x(P(x) A 14) > (P(&) A 14) belong to E*. There- 
fore, E* j- T#I 3 P&,), which together with lP(f,,,,) E E* implies E* 14. 
Since E* is deductively closed, 4 E E*. 
Example 17. Let (D, A) be an open default theory, where D = { ’ f$$)}, and 
A = {Q(a) A P(a)}. This default theory (surprisingly?) has a modified Reiter 
extension that contains Zlx(Q(x) A lP(x)). The proof is like that in Example 6. 
Since Q<a> A P(a) i- 3xQW7 by SK, A* k Q<.L,,,,h an4 since A* k W&x,)~ 
there is an extension E* for (D, A*) such that -#(faXecX,) E E*. Thus 3x(Q(x) A 
lP(X)) E E* n St,. 
Bx(Q(x) A if’(x))?’ 
But why should Q(u) A P(a) imply (even by default) 
An obvious reason for the excessive strength of the modified definition is giving 
explicit names for too many implicitly defined theory objects, and the unique 
name assumption for those objects. This problem can be avoided if we use 
Lifschitz’s semantical approach that refers to the theory objects in an indirect 
way. 
6. Semantical definition of extensions 
This section contains a semantical definition of extensions for closed default 
theories introduced by Guerreiro and Casanova in [4], which is the starting point 
for Lifschitz’s and our approaches in Sections 7 and 8. For what follows we need a 
precise definition of semantics for the first-order predicate calculus. 
An L-interpretation w consists of a non-empty domain U,,,, an assignment o 
each n-place predicate symbol P of L of an n-place relation P” in U,,,, and to each 
n-place function symbol f of L of an n-place function f w : U”, + U,,,. (We treat the 
constants of L as O-place function symbols.) 
For a term t(xl, . . . , x,J all of whose variables are among xi, . . . ,x,, we define 
a function, t”‘, from U”, to U, by induction, as follows. Let ul, . . . , u, E U,. If t is 
a variable xi, then t”‘(z+, . . . , un) = ui; and if t =f(tl, . . . , t,), where f is an 
m-place function symbol, then 
’ A similar argument shows that Reiter’s original definition suffers from the same problem. 
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t”‘(u,, . . . ,qr) =fw(ty(u,, >Un), ,t;;(u,, . . ,uJ) 
(Recall that we treat the constants of L as O-place function symbols.) We call 
t”‘(u, . . ) u,,) the value of t(x,, ,x,,) at u,, . . . .u,. 
Let 4(x,, . ,x,,) be a formula all of whose variables are among x1, . ,x,. We 
say that w satisfies C#I at u,, . . , u,!, denoted w k +(u,, . . , u,), if the following 
holds. If 4 is an atomic formula P(t,, , t,), then w k 4 if and only if 
(t;(u,, . .u,,), . , fff’(u,,...,U,I))EP”;w~$>cC,ifandonlyifw~+implies 
w~~;w~l~ifandonlyifw~~;andw~Vx~(x)ifandonlyforeachu~U,, 
w I= 4(u). 
For an interpretation w we define the L-theory of w, denoted Th,(w), as the set 
of all sentences of L satisfied by w. That is, Th,(w) = {$ E St,: w k +}. Let X be 
a set of sentences over L. We say that w is a model of X, if XC Th,(w). Finally, 
for a class of interpretations W we define the L-theory of W, denoted Th,(W), as 
the set of all sentences of L satisfied by all the elements of W. That is, Th,(W) = 
n ,, Ew ‘Q_(w). 
We say that interpretations w, and wa are L-equivalent, if Th,(w,) = Th,(w,). 
Note that the assignment o the equality relation in interpretations is a binary 
relation that does not have to be identity in the domain of the interpretation, but 
satisfies the equality first-order axioms. (Interpretations where the assignment o 
the equality relation is identity in the domain of the interpretation are called 
normal, see [12, p. 781 for details.) That is, equality relation is treated as an 
ordinary dyadic predicate which satisfies the equality axioms. 
Extensions for a closed default theory can be defined semantically as follows. 
Definition 18 [4]. Let (D, A) be a closed default theory. For any class of 
interpretations W let ZCD,AJ (W) be the largest class of models of A that satisfies 
the following condition. 
If a :MP,,....MP m E D, (Y E Th,(-ZC,.,,(W)), and iPI,. . , lP,,,gTh,(W), then 
Y ETh,(&;,,,(W)).8 
It is known from [4] that the definition of extensions as the theories of the fixed 
points of _Z is equivalent to Reiter’s original definition (Definition 2). That is, a 
set of sentences E is an extension for a closed default theory (0, A) if and only if 
E =Th,(W) for some fixed point W of Z;D.Aj. 
7. Lifschitz’s approach to open default theories. 
In this section we examine Lifschitz’s definition of extensions for open default 
theories, called a default logic with a fixed universe [9, Section 31. This definition 
involves a class of interpretations, called U-worlds, which are defined below. 
’ This largest class ,I ” ,o,a,(W) always exists, see 19, Proposition 11. 
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Definition 19. Let U be a non-empty set. A U-world is a normal L-interpretation 
w such that U,,, = U. That is, the equality relation of L is interpreted in w by 
identity: w k u1 = w u2 if and only if u1 and z.+ are the same element of U. 
Lifschitz’s definition of extensions for open default theories is a relativization of 
Definition 18 to U-worlds. 
Definition 20. Let U be a non-empty set and let (D, A) be a default theory. For 
any set of U-worlds W let A&,Aj( W be the largest set, V, of U-worlds which are ) 
models of A and for which the following condition is satisfied. 
For any a(x) ’MPl(~~x;~ ‘2 MP&) E D, and any tuple u of elements of U, if 
4~) E Th,o(V), and l&(u), . . . , %WB’%,,W)~ then ~(4 E Th,JV), 
where L, denotes the language obtained from L by extending its set of constants 
with all elements of U.9 
We refer to the set W as the set of possible worlds, and we refer to the set V as 
the set of belief worlds. Note that the sentences of L, are of the form 
4(u,, . . > u,), where ul,. . .,u,EU, and +(x1,.. . ,x,) is a formula of L all of 
whose free variables are among x1, . . . , x,. 
A set of sentences E is called a U-extension for (D, A) if E = Th,(W) for some 
fixed point W of A&,Aj. Below U-extensions are referred to as Lifschitz 
extensions. 
As it was pointed out in [9], Definition 20 when applied to closed default 
theories is not equivalent to Definition 2, because the cardinality of U can be 
extracted from a U-extension in the following manner. For a positive integer n 
consider the sentence 
3x,*--3x, A 
( I<i<,<n 
X,fXj Avx( ,~nx=xi)) ) 
denoted e,, , which states that there are exactly n distinct theory objects. For a 
domain U we defined card, = {e,}, if U is of a finite cardinality n, and card, = 
{~enL=l.2....9 if U is infinite. It immediately follows from Definitions 19 and 20 
that any U-extension must contain card, as a subset, even for closed default 
theories (whose extensions do not depend on U). Thus Lifschitz’s approach does 
not pass the formal test.“’ 
As we shall see in the next section, the above deficiency of Lifschitz’s approach 
can be eliminated, if we replace U-worlds by infinite non-normal interpretations 
with the same domain. That is, the equality symbol does not have to be 
interpreted by identity, but by an equivalence relation that satisfies the equality 
axioms, exactly as in the classical model theory. (For example e, has a model w 
with an infinite domain U,,,. In this model the number of the equivalence classes of 
CJ, modulo = w is n.) However, Lifschitz’s definition has a deeper intrinsic 
problem, illustrated by the following example. 
9 This largest set A” cD,a,(W) always exists, see [9, Proposition 31 
‘” Example 21 below shows that it is also counterintuitive. 
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Example 21. Consider an open default theory (D, A), where D = { ’ f$ip,:“‘} and 
A = {a # b, Vx(x = a v x = b), 3xP(x), 3mP(x)}. The axioms ~.x(x = a v x = b) 
and a #b are an instance of the domain closure assumption stating that each 
theory object is represented either by a or by b. Thus, (D, A) has a U-extension 
only when the cardinality of U is 2, which avoids the above deficiency 
Lifschitz’s definition in the case of this example, but raises a new problem. 
Given ~X(X = a v x = b), it seems very natural to replace D by the set of its 
closed instances 
DC= : M+‘(a) : MlP(b) ” 
lP(a) ’ lP(b) 1 ’ 
of 
all 
and we would expect the set of extensions for an open default theory (D, A) to 
coincide with the set of extensions for a closed default theory (D’, A). It 
immediately follows from Lemma 3 that (DC, A) has two extensions Th(A U 
{+‘(a)}) and Th(A U {lP(b)}). 
However (D, A) has only one Lifschitz extension Th(A). Indeed, let U = 
{ur, u?}. It can be easily verified that Atb,,, has two fixed points V= {II,, u2} and 
W = {w 1, w2} which are defined by the following table. 
UI u2 WI W, 
a u1 u2 u1 u2 
b u2 ui u2 ul 
P {u,> {u,) {u,: {u2) 
In this table, the meaning of the column marked u, is that the assignment o 
constants in u1 is defined by a”’ = u 1 and b”’ = u2, and the assignment o P in u, is 
defined by P”’ = {ul}. The meaning of the other columns is similar. 
Even though U, and v2 (w, and wz) belong to the same fixed point, their 
assignments to a and b are different. Therefore neither P(a), nor P(b) belongs to 
Th,(V) (Th,(W)). Thus Th,(V) = Th,(W) = Th(A). 
Remark 22. In [9] Lifschitz claims that his formalization of default reasoning does 
not assume the domain closure assumption. However, for each fixed point W of 
Au the following holds. If 4(u) ~Th,~,(w) for every u E U, then V+(x) E 
ThL,(W) as well. In other words, the Carnap rule (which is equivalent to the 
domain closure assumption) is admissible for Th,“(W). In general, it is unclear 
how to deal with open defaults without the closure domain assumption, because 
we need a way to specify all objects of the theory, see [7] for a general discussion. 
Moreover, the domain closure assumption together with the fact that in a U-world 
‘I To some extent, such a replacement is analogous to the completion of a program in logic 
programming. 
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the assignment o the equality of L is identity (which corresponds to the unique 
name assumption, see Proposition 43 in the next section) is the reason for which 
we can extract the cardinality of U from a U-extension. 
One of the reasons for counterintuitive consequences of Lifschitz’s approach is 
that it does not distinguish between the assignments to explicitly and implicitly 
defined function symbols, In particular, in Example 21, the O-place function 
symbols (constants) a and b are treated as objects implicitly defined by their 
properties. The precise definition is as follows. 
Definition 23. Let P be a mapping from the set of all function symbols f of a 
language L to a list of new predicate symbols Pr. We assume that P is one-to-one 
and, if f is an n-place function symbol, then Pr is an (n + 1)-place (defining) 
predicate symbol. We call the language L, obtained from L by deleting its 
function symbols and extending its predicate symbols with Pf’s the defining 
expansion of L. The sentence Vx, - * - V.x,3!xPf(x1,. . . ,x,, x) is called a defining 
axiom. The set of all defining axioms is denoted by D. 
For a formula 4 of L we define its translation, denoted dp, into L,, by 
induction, as follows. Consider a sequence &, +i, . . . of formulas over the 
language obtained by extending L with the new predicate symbols, such that & is 
9, and 4i+1 results from & in the following manner. If +i does not contain 
function symbols, then the sequence terminates at +i. Otherwise, let f(tl, . . . , t,) 
be the leftmost term in 4i such that all ti are variables, and let P(. . . , f(tl, . . . , 
L), . . .) be the atomic subformula of 4i that contains that term. Then 4i+1 is 
obtained from +i by replacing P(. . . , f(tl, . . . , t,), . . .) with 3x(P&,, . . . , t,, x) 
A P(. . . ) x, . . .)). Since +i+1 contains one function symbol less than &, the above 
sequence must terminate. The last formula in the sequence is 4’. For a set of 
L-formulas X we define a set of L,-formulas Xp by Xp = (4’: 4 E X}, and 
for a set D of defaults over L we define a set Dp of defaults over L, by 
Finally, for a first-order theory X over L, the defining expansion of X is a 
theory XD over L, defined by XD = Xp U D. 
Proposition 24 below establishes a relationship between Lifschitz extensions for 
a default theory and its defining expansion, and sheds more light on the reason for 
the counterintuitive behavior of Lifschitz extensions demonstrated by Example 
10. 
Proposition 24. Let (D, A) be a default theory. Then E is a Lifschitz extension for 
(D, A) if and only if E ’ is a Lifschitz extension for (D’, AD). 
Proof. Let w be an L-interpretation. Consider an L,-interpretation wp such that 
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U,P = U,, for any predicate symbol P of L, Pwp = P”, and for any n-place 
function symbol f of L, the assignment o Pf is defined by 
P;‘={(u I,..., u,,. f”‘(U ,,..., u,,)): u I,..., U,,EU,.}. 
It can be readily verified that wp k D, and that for any LEw sentence 
Hu1,. . .9un), +4&.. . , u,) if and only if wp k +“(ul,. . . , u,). 
Conversely, let w be an L,-interpretation such that w k D. Consider an 
L-interpretation wF such that U,, = U,, for any predicate symbol P of L, 
PWF = P”, and for any n-place function symbol f of L and u,, ,u, E U,,, 
f qu,, . . . , un) is defined as follows. By D, there is a unique (modulo = “) u E U 
such that wkP,“(u,,... , u,~, u), and we put fWF(u,, . . . , un) = u. Again, for any 
Luw sentence +(u,, . . . , u,), wF k $(u,, . . , un) if any only if w k +‘(ul, . . . , ~4~). 
Now it follows that W is a fixed point of AYn,A, if and only if Wp = {w’: w E IV} 
is a fixed point of A&I,,~,~), which completes the proof. 0 
8. A modification of Lifschitz’s approach 
In this section we modify Lifschitz’s approach to make it free from the 
deficiencies discussed in the previous section. An obvious way to avoid the 
reference to the cardinality of the interpretation is to replace U-worlds by 
ordinary interpretations, and avoiding the function (constant) interpretation 
problem in Example 21, can be achieved by “separating” the assignments to 
functions and predicate symbols in an interpretation. In particular, we should 
require the interpretations under consideration to have the same assignments to 
function symbols. Example 29 below formalizes these stronger requirements, but 
shows that they are still insufficient. First we need the following definition. 
Definition 25. An L-pre-interpretation F consists of a non-empty domain I!J~ and 
an assignment o each n-place function symbol f of L, of an n-place function 
f”: UF+ U,. (Recall that we treat the constants of L as O-place function 
symbols.) 
In view of the above definition, an interpretation can be thought of as a 
pre-interpretation together with an assignment to the predicate symbols, or, 
alternatively, a pre-interpretation can be thought as a “function structure” of 
corresponding interpretations.‘* The pre-interpretation of an interpretation w is 
denoted by F,, and we say that w is based on F,. 
I* Pre-interpretations are widely used in logic programming to separate between the assignments to 
function and predicate symbols. see [IO]. Usually only one pre-interpretation is considered, the free, 
Herbrand one. Our modification of Lifschitz’s approach is also based on free pre-interpretations, see 
Definition 34 below. 
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Definition 26. An L-interpretation based on a pre-interpretation F is called an 
F-world. 
The opening paragraph of this section suggests to modify Definition 20 by 
adding the following compatibility requirement. 
Definition 27. Let F be a pre-interpretation and let (D, A) be a default theory. 
For any set W of F-worlds let AF CD,AI(W) be the largest set, V, of F-worlds which 
are models of A that satisfies the following condition. 
For any U(x) ’ MP1c$j’ xMB&) E D, and any tuple u of elements of U,, if 
a(u) E Th,UF(V, and lP1(Io,. . . , -@&)~%,JW)~ then ~(4 E ThL,FW13 
A set of sentences E is called an F-extension for (D, A) if there is a fixed point 
w of fG.A, such that E = l%,(W). (Note that W must be a set of F-worlds.) 
Remark 28. The notion of F-extensions is similar to that of default logic with fixed 
constants [9, Section 61, also see Definition 49 in the next section. In Lifschitz’s 
terminology, F-extensions are extensions all of whose functions symbols are fixed. 
Example 29. Consider a closed default theory ({w}, 0) which has a unique 
extension Th( {CX # b}). However it has two F-extensions: Th( {a = b}) and 
Th( {a Z b}). The former corresponds to the pre-interpretations with the same 
assignment to a and b, and the letter corresponds to the pre-interpretations, 
where the assignments to a and b are different. 
Example 29 shows that the notion of compatibility introduced by Definitions 
25-27 is not sufficient for the following reason. Fixing the assignments to function 
symbols might impose some undesirable constraints on the assignment o equality 
in the interpretation. (In the example, uw =W b” is such a constraint on the 
assignment o equality in the interpretation w.) Therefore, if we want to proceed 
in that way, we must restrict ourselves to independent assignments to function 
symbols, i.e., to pre-interpretations which, roughly speaking, assign distinct 
elements of the domain to different terms. 
Definition 30. Let b be a set that contains no symbols of L. The Herbrand 
pre-interpretation for L, ,I4 denoted Hb, is the pre-interpretation whose domain 
UH, consist of all closed terms of L,, and for any n-place function symbol f and 
closed terms t, , . . . , t,, of L,, f Hh(t,, . . . , t,) = f(tl, . . . , t,). The set b is called the 
base of Hh.” 
I3 Similarly to [9, Proposition 31 it can be shown that this largest class A&,,(W) always exists. In fact, 
a routine inspection of the proof shows that it holds in the case of pre-interpretations as well. 
I4 Recall that L, is obtained from L by extending the set of constants of L with the elements of b. 
I5 It can be shown that any pre-interpretation can be obtained (up to an isomorphism) by factorizing a 
Herbrand pre-interpretation modulo some congruence relation, see the proof of Proposition 33. 
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Definition 31. A pre-interpretation is called free if it is isomorphic to a Herbrand 
pre-interpretation. The base b, of a free pre-interpretation F is the subset of its 
domain U, which consists of those elements u such that for no (n-place) function 
symbol f of L and for no u, , . , CL, E U,, u = f F(u,, . . . , un). 
Free pre-interpretations play a major role in our modification to Lifschitz’s 
approach; for a better intuition, some of their basic properties are stated below. 
For any free pre-interpretation F the following holds. 
For all pairs of m- and n-place distinct function symbols g and f of L and for 
all ul, . . . , u,, ul, . , u, E U,, gF(u,, . . . , urn) #f F(u,, . . , u,). (Recall that 
we treat the constants of L as O-place function symbols.) 
For each n-place function symbol f of L and for all ul, . . , u,, , u,, . . . , u, E 
U, such that for some i = 1, . . . , II, u, # ui, f F(ul, . . . , u,,) #f “(u,, . . . , u,,). 
For each term t(x, , . ,x,,) of L, whose set of free variables is {x,, . . . ,x,}, 
and for all u,, . . , u,~ E U,., f(u,, . ,un) # ui, i = 1,. . , II. Moreover, the 
following binary relation cF on U, is well-founded. For u,u E U,, u <F u if 
and only if there exist an n-place function symbol f of L, IZ > 0, and 
u,,..., u,EU,suchthatforsomei=l,...,n,u,=uandf~(u,,...,u,)= 
U. 
The above properties of free pre-interpretations how that normal interpreta- 
tions based on free pre-interpretations atisfy the equality theory, see [lo, p. 791 
for the axioms of the equality theory.16 Conversely, it can be shown that if a 
pre-interpretation of a model of the equality theory is well-founded, then it is 
free. 
Definition 32. A free pre-interpretation with an infinite base is called universal.17 
The “universal” property of universal pre-interpretations is given by Proposi- 
tion 33 below. 
Proposition 33. Let A be a consistent L-theory, and let F be a universal pre- 
interpretation. Then A has a model whose pre-interpretation is F. 
Proof. Let b be the base of F. Renaming the elements of U,, if necessary, we 
may assume that F = Hb. Since b is infinite, there is a model w of A such that 
U, = b, see [l, Corollary 2.1.6, p. 671. For each u E UHh, we define an element 
E(U) of b(=U,), by E(U) = u for u E b, and for a closed term f(t,, . . . , t,) of L, we 
define e( f(t,, . t,)) by E( f(t,, . , t,)) =fW(.$t,), . . , E(t,)). 
lb In logic programming the equality theory is used in the context of defining negation by Clark’s 
completion. In particular, it allows a consistency between equality in a model and the result of 
unification between first-order terms, see [lo] for a detailed exposition of the subject. 
I’ Universal pre-interpretations naturally arise in the Henkin proof of the completeness theorem, see 
[12, Lemma 2.161. 
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Consider an interpretation wb such that F,,,, = Hb and for an n-place predicate 
symbol P, Pwb = {(u,, . . . ,u,): (E(u~), . . . , E(u,)) E P”}. We prove by induction 
on the length of an L-formula 4(x,, . . . ,x,) that wb k 4(u,, . . . , un) if and only if 
NJ t= 4(&(%), . . ., E(u,)). By the definition of wb this is true for atomic formulas, 
and the case of propositional connectives 3 and 1 is immediate. For the case of 
the existential quantifier, if wb k 3x4(x, ul,. . . , u,), then for some u E Uwb, 
wb k #@, u1,. . . > u,>* By the induction hypothesis, w k +(E(u), E(u~), . . . , 
&J), which implies w k 3x$+, E(ZQ), . . . , E(u,)). Conversely, if w k 
3+(x, +I), . . . , e(u,)), then for some u E U,,,, w k 4(~, E(u~), . . . , I). By 
definition, u = E(U). Thus, by the induction hypothesis, wb /= +(u, ul,. . . , un), 
which implies wb k 3x+(x, ur, . . . , un). 0 
Our modification to Lifschitz’s approach (Definitions 19 and 20) is replacing 
U-worlds by F-worlds, for a universal pre-interpretation F. 
Definition 34. Let F be a universal pre-interpretation and let (D, A) be a default 
theory. We call F-extensions for (D, A) modified Lifschitz extensions or universal 
extensions. 
The difference between Definition 34 and Lifschitz’s original definition (Defini- 
tion 20) is the replacement of sets of normal interpretations over the same 
possibly finite domain by sets of interpretations based on the same universal 
pre-interpretation. (In other words we allow the assignments to equality to vary 
over the pre-interpretation domain.) In particular, whereas Lifschitz’s original 
definition, requiring the normal interpretation of the equality relation, emphasizes 
the predicate structure of the interpretation, our approach is based on the 
compatibility of the function assignments. 
Examples 38-41 below (which are continuations of Examples 5, 16, 17, and 21 
respectively) show the behavior of the modified definition in some cases where 
both Reiter’s and Lifschitz’s approaches are counterintuitive. The proofs in this 
section are based on the following definition and lemmas. In particular, Lemma 
37 is similar to Lemma 3 and is a relativization of [9, Proposition 61 to the 
F-worlds. 
Definition 35. Let p(x) be an L-formula. For an interpretation w, p”’ denotes the 
set of tuples u such that w k P(U). Let D be a set of normal defaults without 
prerequisites and let F be a pre-interpretation. We say that an F-world w is 
D-maximal if there is no F-world w’ such that for all w E D, p”’ C p ‘“‘; and 
for some w E D, p”’ is a proper subset of p”‘. Finally, we say that F-worlds 
w1 and w2 are D-equivalent, denoted w1 -D w2, if /?“‘I = /3”‘, for all w E D. 
(It immediately follows from the definition that yD is an equivalence relation.) 
Lemma 36. Let (D, A) be a default theory and let D contain a normal default 
without prerequisites w. Let F be an L-pre-interpretation and let W be a set of 
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F-worlds. If for some w E W and some tuple u of elements of U,, w + /3(u), then 
for any u E Af,,,,(W), TV k P(u). 
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the definition of Af;D,aj (Definition 
27). 0 
The following lemma is similar to [9, Proposition 61 which shows that the fixed 
points of A:;+J) ,,,) correspond to the extends of /3 in {/3}-maximal U-worlds. 
Lemma 37. Let F be a pre-interpretation and let D be a set of normal defaults 
without prerequisites. A set of F-worlds is a fixed point of Aru,Aj if and only if it is 
an equivalence class of the restriction of --tI to the D-maximal F-worlds which are 
models of A. 
Proof. Let W be an equivalence class of zu restricted to the D-maximal F-worlds 
which are models of A. Then the set of belief F-worlds W satisfies the condition of 
Definition 27 for the set of possible worlds W. In order to show that W is the 
maximal set of F-worlds satisfying that condition assume to the contrary, that it is 
a proper subset of AcI,Aj(W). By definition, Aru,Aj(W) k A, and, by Lemma 36, 
each element of AF (D,Aj(W) is D-equivalent to the elements of W, and, therefore, 
is D-maximal. Since W is an equivalence class of -D restricted to the D-maximal 
F-worlds which are models of A, AF (n Aj(W) c W, in contradiction with the 
assumption that W is a proper subset of iru,Aj(W). This proves the ‘Yf” direction 
of the lemma. 
Conversely, let W be a fixed point of AFn AI. By Lemma 36, for any two worlds 
w,,w? E W and for all w ED, /3”’ = bw2. Therefore, for all w ED we 
may write p W for p”‘. where w E W. In order to prove that W is an equivalence 
class of the restriction of --[) to the D-maximal F-worlds which are models of A, 
assume to the contrary that there exists an F-world w’F W such that w’ k A and 
for all w ED, pw c j3”“. Then the set of belief worlds V = W U {w ‘} satisfies 
the condition of Definition 27 for the default theory (D, A) and the set of possible 
worlds W, in contradiction with the maximality of W. This proves the “only if” 
direction of the lemma. 0 
Example 38. Let (D, A) be as in Example 5. That is, D = {q}, and A = 
{3xQ(x)}. Ob vrously, if an F-world w satisfying ZlxQ(x) is P-maximal, then 
w k VxP(x). Therefore (D, A) has a unique modified Lifschitz extension 
{VxP(x), 3xQ(x)}. In particular, this extension contains 3x(P(x) A Q(x)), which is 
what we expect in our case of an implicitly defined individuals, see the discussion 
in Example 5. 
Example 39. Let (D, A) be as in Example 16. That is, D = { ’ y$y’>, and 
A = {P(a)}. Let w be a lP-maximal F-world. Then (iI’)“’ = U, - {a”‘}. Thus, by 
Lemma 37 (D, A) has a unique modified Lifschitz extension Th({Vx(P(x) =x = 
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a)}). We see that, like in Example 15, the meaning of default w is that P(X) 
is assumed to be false whenever possible. 
Example 40. Let (D, A) be as in Example 17. That is, D = {w}, and 
A = {Q(a) A P(a)}. Let w be a lP-maximal F-world. Then (+‘)” = U,,, - {a”‘}. 
Thus, by Lemma 37, (D, A) has a unique modified Lifschitz extension 
Th({Vx((Q(x) A P(X)) =x = a)}). That is, as above, P(X) is assumed to be false 
whenever possible. 
Example 41. Let (D, A) be as in Example 21. That is, D = {w} and 
A = {a # b, Vx(x = u v x = b), 3xP(x), 3x-#(x)}. By Lemma 37, (D, A) has two 
modified Lifschitz extensions Th(A U {lP(u)}) and Th(A U {+‘(b)}), which are 
exactly what we expect in our case of an explicitly defined finite domain, see the 
discussion in Example 21. 
The next theorem shows that modified Lifschitz extensions pass the formal test. 
That is, for closed default theories they coincide with the ordinary extensions. 
Theorem 42. Let (D, A) be a closed default theory. Then a set of sentences is an 
extension for (D, A) if and only if it is a modified Lifschitz extension for (D, A). 
Proof. Let E be an extension for (D, A) and let F be a universal L*-pre- 
interpretation. By Proposition 33, for each model w of E there is an L-equivalent 
interpretation wF based on F. 
Let W= {wF: w k E}. By the definition of wF, W is a set of F-worlds such that 
E = Th,(W). Thus in order to prove that E is an F-extension for (D, A), it 
suffices to show that W is the largest set of belief F-worlds that satisfies the 
condition of Definition 27 for the default theory (D, A) and the set of possible 
worlds W. 
Let a :“Pl,...,MPm E D, such that a EThr+(W), and lpi,. . . ,%, 
$Th,” (W). (kecall that (D, A) is a closed default theory.) Since, Th,(W) = E 
and E ‘is an extension for (D, A), y E E (=Th,(W)), i.e., the condition of 
Definition 27 is satisfied. To prove that W is the largest set satisfying that 
condition, assume to the contrary, that Afb,Aj(W) contains Was a proper subset. 
Let wF E A;“D Aj (W) - W. Then, by the definition of W, wF p E, which implies 
that B = l%&&,,,(W)) is a proper subset of E. Obviously, B satisfies properties 
(Dl)-(D3) of Definition 2 for (D, A) and S = E, in contradiction with the 
minimality of E. This completes the proof of the “only if” part of the theorem. 
Conversely, let E be an F-extension for (D, A). That is E = ThL(A&Aj(W)), 
for some fixed point W of A[D,A,. Obviously, B = E satisfies properties (Dl)-(D3) 
of Definition 2 for (D, A) and S = E. It remains to prove that B is the minimal set 
satisfying those properties. Assume to the contrary, that q,,,,(E) is a proper 
subset of B(=E). Then, by Proposition 33, there is a model w of 4, Aj(E) such 
that F,,, = F, and w k E. Thus we W. It follows that the set of belief worlds 
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W U {w} satisfies the condition of Definition 27 for the default theory (D, A) and 
the set of possible worlds W, in contradiction with the maximality of W, which 
completes the proof of the theorem. Cl 
Propositions 43 and 44 below give a relationship between the original and 
modified Lifschitz’s approaches. They state the Lifschitz extensions for a rather 
large class of default theories can be defined in terms of modified Lifschitz 
extensions. Proposition 43 shows that the cardinality of domain U can be 
expressed by the axiom card,, and the reference to normal interpretations can be 
expressed by the default ’ ::&:I”2 which corresponds to the unique name 
assumption, see [7, Section 31. In Proposition 44 we simulate the unique name 
assumption by two defaults: 
: Mx, #x2 : Mx, =x2 IX 
x,#x, - x, =x, . 
which allows to describe Lifschitz extension in terms of modified Lifschitz 
extensions without explicit reference to the cardinality of the domain. 
Proposition 43. Assume that L contains no function symbols. Then a set of 
sentences is a Lifschitz extension for (D, A) if and only if for some U, it is a 
modified Lifschitz extension for 
Proposition 44. Assume that L contains no function symbols. Then a set of 
sentences is a Lifschitz extension for (D. A) if and only if it is a modified Lifschitz 
extension for 
:Mx,fx2 :Mx,=x2 
x, #x, ’ x, =x2 
Propositions 43 and 44 are immediate corollaries, respectively, of Theorems 53 
and 54 which we prove in the next section. The theorems generalize the 
propositions to default logics with fixed constants. 
The following corollaries to Propositions 43 and 44 show how Lifschitz 
extensions can be translated into modified ones. 
Corollary 45. Let (D, A) be a default theory. Then a set of sentences is a Lifschitz 
extension for (0, A) if and only if for some U, EP is a modified Lifschitz extension 
f or 
I* These defaults correspond to the modal strict equality axioms M(x, #x2) > (x, Zx,) and 
M(x, =x2)1(x, =x2), see [5. p. 1901. 
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(DP”{ :y~~},ADUcard,). 
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Propositions 24 and 43. Cl 
Corollary 46. Let (D, A) be a default theory. Then a set of sentences is a Lifschitz 
extension for (D, A) if and only if EP is a modified Lifschitz extension for 
: Mx, #x, : Mx, =x* 
x,#x, ’ x1 =x* 
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Propositions 24 and 44. q 
9. Default logic with fixed constants 
In this section we express extensions for default logics with fixed constants 
introduced in [9, Section 61 in terms of modified Lifschitz extensions, see 
Theorems 53 and 54 below. These theorems show that a predicate P can be fixed 
by two “opposite” defaults : ?I$?) and w. That is, fixing constants can be 
moved down from the “meta-level” to the “object level”, which allows US to 
avoid Lifschitz’s explicit reference to fixed constants. 
We believe that the results in this section are of interest because, apart from 
showing the expressive power of modified Lifschitz extensions, they allow to 
establish a relationship between (modified) Lifschitz extensions and the original 
McCarthy’s circumscription, where all the predicate symbols (but the cir- 
cumscribed one) and all the function symbols are fixed.” 
To proceed we need the following generalizations of Definitions 25-27. 
Definition 47. Let C be a set of function and predicate symbols of L. A 
C-structure s consists of a non-empty domain US, an assignment o each n-place 
predicate symbol P of C of an n-place relation P” in US, and to each n-place 
function symbol f of C of an n-place function fS : 17: + Us.” If C contains = and 
=S is identity, then s is called normal. 
Definition 48. Let s be a C-structure. We say that an L-interpretation w is an 
s-world, if U, = U,; for each predicate symbol P of C, P” = P”; and for each 
function symbol f of C, f w = f”. If s is a normal C-structure, then s-worlds are 
also called normal. 
I9 Some embeddings of circumscription into open default theories are presented in the next section. 
*’ In particular, if C consists of all the function symbols of L, then the class of C-structures coincides 
with the class of L-pre-interpretations, and if C consists of all the function and predicate symbols of L, 
then the class of C-structures coincides with the class of L-interpretations. 
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Definition 49. Let C be a set of function and predicate symbols of L. Let s be a 
C-structure and let (D, A) be a default theory. For any set W of s-worlds let 
A” (D,Aj(W) be the largest set, V, of s-worlds which are models of A that satisfies 
the following condition. 
For any *MBi(x:(X;, MP&) E D, and any tuple II of elements of U,, if 
a(u) E Th,[, (V), and l&(u), . . . , -R,(4~ThLU (W>, then ~(4 ~ThLUJV).Z’ 
A set of sentences E is called a (normal) C-exteksion for (II, A) if there exist a 
(normal) C-structure s and a fixed point W of ATD, Aj such that E = Th,(W). 
(Note that W must be a set of s-worlds.) 
Remark 50. By definition, each normal C-extension is a Lifschitz extension with 
the fixed constants C and vice versa, see [9, Section 61. 
Example 51. Let C consist of all the function symbols of L. Then each C- 
extension is an F-extension and vice versa. 
Example 52. As we shall see in the proof of Theorem 54 below, each {=}- 
extension is a Lifschitz extension and vice versa. 
Theorems 53 and 54 below describe a large class of normal C-extensions in 
terms of modified Lifschitz extensions. 
Theorem 53. Assume that L contains no function symbols. Then a set of sentences 
is a normal C-extension for (D, A) if and only if for some CT, it is a modified 
Lifschitz extension for 
Theorem 54. Let C contain all the function symbols of L. Then a set of sentences 
is a normal C-extension for (D, A) if and only if it is a modified Lifschitz extension 
f or 
( i D” : MlP(X) : MP(x) lP(X) ’ P(x) Ld4~ 
We see that Propositions 43 and 44 follow from Theorems 53 and 54, 
respectively, with C = 0. 
Proof of Theorem 53. Let U be a non-empty set. Let F be a universal pre- 
interpretation and let W be a fixed point of 
A;&,{ ox +I MPlP(Xj 3 x1:x2’~J Ip(,) ’ p(x) }mzc.A”-rdc~) ’ 
” Similarly to [9, Proposition 31 it can be shown that this largest class A;,,,,(W) always exists 
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Substituting -tP(x) for p(x) in Lemma 36, P E C U { =}, we obtain that the 
assignment o P is the same relation Pw on U, in all the elements of W. (Recall 
that all the elements of W have the same domain U,.) In particular, =w ’ is a 
congruence relation. Since card, E Th,(W), the cardinality of the set of equiva- 
lence classes of =w . 1s equal to the cardinality of U, if U is finite, and is infinite 
otherwise. Therefore we may replace U by the set of equivalence classes of =w, 
which we shall also denote by U. We denote the equivalence class of u E U, by 
E(U). 
For an F-world w E W, let E(W) denote the interpretation over the domain U 
such that for an n-place predicate symbol P of L, P”““’ = {(I, . . . , E(u,)): 
(u,,. .* t un) E P”}. Since the elements of the same equivalence class are in- 
distinguishable in w, E(W) is well defined (and is L-equivalent to w). It follows that 
the restriction of any E(W) to the assignments to the elements of C results in the 
same C-structure s. Moreover, since, by definition, =’ is identity, s is normal. 
Let E(W) = {E(W): w E W}. We contend that E(W) is a fixed point of A&,Aj 
such that Th,(s(W)) = l%,(W). 
Let w E W. It follows from the definition of c(w) that for any formula 
4(x,, . . . ,xn) of L and any ui, . . . , u,, E U,, w 1 +(u,, . . . , un) if and only if 
c(w) t= +(s(%)Y.. . , E(u,)). Therefore, (p(u,, . . 
4(&(U,), . . 
. , un) E Th,$W) if and only if 
. , E(u,)) E ThLo;(.s(W)). This, in particular, imphes that ThL(c(W)) = 
Th,(W) (therefore E(W) k A), and that the set of the belief normal s-worlds 
E(W) satisfies the condition of Definition 49 for (D, A) and the set of possible 
normal s-worlds c(W). It remains to show that e(W) is the largest set of the belief 
normal s-worlds satisfying that condition. 
So, assume to the contrary that there is a set of the belief normal s-worlds V 
such that E(W) is a proper subset of V, and V satisfies the condition of Definition 
49 for (D, A) and the set of possible normal s-worlds E(W). Since s is a normal 
C-structure, V satisfies the condition of Definition 49 for 
and the set of possible worlds c(W) as well. For an element LJ E V, let E-~(U) 
denote the following interpretation based on F. For an n-place predicate symbol 
P of L, PE-l(U) = {(ul,. . . , u,): (a, . . . , E(u,)) E P”}. Then W is a proper 
subset of K’(V) = {E-~(U): u E V}, and the set of the belief F-worlds E-‘(V) 
satisfies the condition of Definition 27 for 
and the set of possible F-worlds W, because, by the definition of E, for any 
formula 4(x,, . . . ,x,) of L and 
ThLUF(e-l(V)) if 
any ui, . . . , u, E U,, +(ul, . . . , un) E 
and only if ~(E(u~), . . . , E(u,)) E Th,JV). However, this 
contradicts the maximality of W. 
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Conversely, let s be a normal C-structure, and let W be a fixed point of A;D,AJ. 
We distinguish between the case of finite and infinite U,. First assume that U, is 
infinite. Let F be a universal pre-interpretation with the base U,. (Since L has no 
function symbols, F = U, = U, .) Then the belief set W considered as a set of 
F-worlds satisfies the condition of Definition 27 for 
: MlP(x) : MP(x) 
lP(X) ' P(r) 
, A U card, 
PEC 
and the set of possible F-worlds W. (Recall the elements of Ware s-worlds.) Thus 
the proof in the case of infinite U will be completed if we show that W is the 
largest set of the belief F-worlds satisfying that condition. Assume to the contrary 
that there is a set of the belief F-worlds Vsuch that W is a proper subset of V, and 
V satisfies the condition of Definition 27 for 
: MlP(x) : MP(x) 
lP(X) ' P(x) 
, A U card, 
PEC 
and the set of possible F-worlds W. Let P E C U { =}. Substituting 1P for p in 
Lemma 36, we obtain that V is a set of s-worlds, which contradicts the maximality 
of w. 
Now assume that U, is finite. Let F be a universal pre-interpretation and let E 
be a mapping from U,; onto U,. For an s-world w E W, let E-‘(W) denote the 
interpre;a;ion,over the domain U, such that for an n-place predicate symbol P of 
L, P’ ” - ,(u, , . , u,,): (.$u,), . . , E(u,,)) E P”}. (In particular, it follows 
from the definition that f-‘(w) is L-equivalent to w.) Since for a uE Us, the 
elements of F-‘(U) are indistinguishable by E-‘(W), E-‘(W) k A U card,. More- 
over, since L contains no function symbols, E-‘(W) is an F-world. Let L’(W) = 
{F-‘(W): w E W}. We intend to show that K’(W) is a fixed point of 
: MlP(x) : MP(x) 
lP(X) ' P(x) 
, A U card, 
P E c 
such that Th,,(F ‘(W)) = Th,.(W). 
Obviously, for any formula 4(x,. . ,x,) of L and any u,, . . . , u,, E U,, 
4(u,, . . . . L~,,)ET~,.~,(F ‘(W)) if and only if +(E(u,), . . . , E(u,)) E ThrJW). 
Therefore Th,,(f-‘(W)) =Th,(W). This together with the definition of the 
assignments of the predicate symbols of C U {=} in the elements of E-I(W) 
implies that and that the set of the belief F-worlds e-‘(W) satisfies the condition 
of Definition 27 for 
: MlP(x) : MP(x) 
1P(r) ' P(x) 
, A U card, 
PEC 
and the set of possible F-worlds t‘ -l(W). It remains to show that e-l(W) is the 
largest set of the belief worlds satisfying that condition. 
Assume to the contrary that there is a set of the belief worlds V such that 
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&-‘w> . P P IS a ro er subset of V, and V satisfies the condition of Definition 13 for 
the default theory 
and the set of possible F-worlds E-‘(W). Let u E V. Then for any P E C and 
any u,,...,u,,EU~, v k P(u,, . . . ,u,) if and only if e-‘(W) k P(u,, . . . ,u,). 
Indeed, since W is a set of s-worlds, either E-‘(W) k P(u,, . . . , un) or E-‘(W) k 
lP(U,,..., K,,). Then the “if” direction follows from Lemma 36 with p being P, 
and the only if direction follows from Lemma 36 with /3 being -IP. Let u1 and u2 
be distinct elements of U,. We contend that u b u1 = u2 if and only if E(u,) = 
E(u~). Let E(u,) # E(u~). Then &-l(W) k u1 # u2, and the “if’ direction follows 
from Lemma 36 with p being #. Now let u k u1 # u2. Were E(u,) = E(u~), the 
number of elements of U, distinguishable by u would exceed the number of 
elements of U, in contradiction with card,. This proves the contention. 
It follows that E(V) is a set of s-worlds which contains Was a proper subset and 
satisfies the condition of Definition 49 for (D, A) and the set of possible s-worlds 
W. However, this contradicts the maximality of W. 0 
Proof of Theorem 54. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 53. Let F be a 
universal pre-interpretation and let W be a fixed point of 
$>U( M7P(r) :MP(r) 7,‘(X) . p(X) )p~cu(=)J) ’ 
Let P E C U { =}. Substituting lP(x) for p(x) in Lemma 36 we obtain that the 
assignment o P is the same relation Pw on U, in all the elements of W. (Recall 
that all the elements of W have the same domain U,.) In particular, = w is a 
congruence relation. We denote the equivalence class of u E U, modulo =w by 
F(U), and we denote the set of equivalence classes of =w by .$U,). That is, 
&(UF) = {G)>,EU,.. 
For an F-world w E W, let E(W) denote the interpretation over the domain 
F(U~) such that for an n-place predicate symbol P of L, P E(W) -- 
{(&(U,)T.. . 74s)): (u,, . . .7 un) E P"} , and for an n-place function symbol f of L 
and for u ,,..., u,EU,, f E(W)(E(UI), . . . , E(u,)) = ~(f”‘(z.+, . . . ,u,)). Since the 
elements of the same equivalence class of =w are indistinguishable in w, E(W) is 
well defined (and is L-equivalent to w). It follows that the restriction of any E(W) 
to the assignments to the elements of C U { =} results in the same C-structure S. 
Moreover, since, by definition, = ’ is identity, s is normal. Now exactly as in the 
proof of Theorem 53 it can be shown that E(W) = {E(W): w E W} is a fixed point 
Of ‘SD A) such that Th,(e(W)) = Th,(W): 
Let ’ w E W. It follows from the definition of E(W) that for any formula 
x ) of L and any u,, . . . ,u,EUF, w k+(u,,. . . ,u,) if and only if 
~($~~,;Ei;,), . . . , E(u,,)). Therefore, 4(u,, . . . , u,) E Th,_(W) if and only if 
+(a&,), . . . > 4~,,)) E ‘-,$P))~ Th is, in particular, implies that Th,(c(W)) = 
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Th,(W) (therefore E(W) k A), and that the set of the belief normal s-worlds 
E(W) satisfies the condition of Definition 49 for (0, A) and the set of possible 
normal s-worlds E(W). It remains to show that E(W) is the largest set of the belief 
normal s-worlds satisfying that condition. 
So, assume to the contrary that there is a set of the belief normal s-worlds V 
such that E(W) is a proper subset of V. and V satisfies the condition of Definition 
49 for (D, A) and the set of possible normal s-worlds E(W). Since s is a normal 
C-structure, V satisfies the condition of Definition 49 for 
: MlP(X) :MY(x) 
lP(X) ' P(x) 
.A 
/'t<'U(= ) 
and the set of possible normal s-worlds e(W) as well. For an element u E V, let 
F-‘(U) denote the following interpretation based on F. For an n-place predicate 
symbol I’ of L, P’~““‘= {(u,, . . .u,): (.z(u,). . . ,F(u,))EP”}. Then W is a 
proper subset of F ‘(V) = {E -l(u): u E V}, and the set of the belief F-worlds 
F-‘(V) satistics the condition of Definition 49 for 
i i 
DU 
: M1P(x) :MP(x) 
lP(X) - P(x) I 
.A 
/'EC'lJ-) 1 
and the set of possible F-worlds W, because, by the definition of F, for any 
formula 4(x,. .x,,) of L and any u,, . . . yt E UFI 4,(u,, . . , un> ET&_+(V) if 
and only if &F(u, ). . F(u,,)) E ThLU (E(V)). However, this contradicts the 
maximality of W. 
Conversely, Ict s be a normal C-structure, and let W be a fixed point of A&,). 
Let F be a universal pre-interpretation such that the cardinality of b, is not less 
than the cardinality of U,. Let E be a mapping from b, onto U,. We extend E onto 
U,, by induction as follows. For an n-place function symbol f of L and 
u,,..., u,, E II,., E(~~(u,. . , u,!)) =~$(E(u,), . , I). (Here we use the con- 
dition that C contains all the function symbols of L.) For an s-world w E W, let 
E-‘(W) denote the interpretation based >z,F such that for an n-place predicate 
symbol P of L and u ,,..., u,,EU~, P’ = {(u,, . . .,&J: (+1),...,44J)E 
P”}. Let F-‘(W)= {E ‘(w): w E W}. We intend to show that E-I(W) is a fixed 
point of 
: MIP(x) +%)},,E_ i, A) 
lP(X) * P(x) 
such that Th,,(& ‘(W)) = ThJW). 
By definition, F-‘(W) is an F-world, and a straightforward induction on the 
complexity of a formula 4(x,, . . ,x,) shows that for all ui, . . . , u, E Us, w F 
~(LL,, . , u,,) if and only if E.-‘(W) k ~(E(u,), . . , I). In particular, E-‘(W) b 
A. Let P E C u { = } . Since s is a (normal) C-structure, the assignment o P is the 
same in all the elements of 6 ‘(W). Therefore Th,(&-l(W)) = Th,(W), and that 
the set of the belief F-worlds F-‘(W) satisfies the condition of Definition 27 for 
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( 1 D” : MlP(X) : MP(x) lP(X) ’ P(x) lp.cu,;,~ A> 
and the set of possible F-worlds &-l(W). It remains to show that e-*(W) is the 
largest set of the belief F-worlds satisfying that condition. 
Assume to the contrary that there is a set of the belief worlds V such that 
e-‘(W) is a proper subset of V, and V satisfies the condition of Definition 27 for 
: MlP(X) :MP(x) 
lP(X) ' P(x) 
and the set of possible F-worlds e-‘(W). Let u E V, P E C U {=}, and let 
Ml,..., U, E U,. We contend that u b P(u,, . . . , u,,) if and only if e-‘(W) k 
P(u,, *. . ,u,). As we have seen earlier, e-‘(W) k P(u,, . . . ,u,) if and only if 
w I= P(&(%), . * . , E(u,)), and, since all the elements of W are (normal) s-worlds, 
either W k P(e(ul), . . . , E(u,)) or W b ~P(E(u~), . . . , E(u,)). Therefore the “if” 
direction of the contention follows from Lemma 36 with p being P, and the only if 
direction follows from Lemma 36 with /3 being -IP. Thus, E(U) is an s-structure. 
It follows that E(V) is the set of s-worlds which contains W as a proper subset. 
Also the set of the belief s-worlds e(V) satisfies the condition of Definition 49 for 
(D, A) and the set of possible s-worlds W, which contradicts the maximality of 
w. cl 
Next we describe normal C-extensions in terms of Lifschitz extensions. 
Theorem 55. A set of sentences is a normal C-extension for (D, A) if and only if it 
is a Lifschitz extension for 
( 1 D" :M1P(x) : MP(x) lP(X) ' P(x) 1 { ” :Mf(x)#x :Mf(x)=x PEC f(x)#x ’ f(x)=x lecYA . 1 > 
For the proof of Theorem 4 we need to extend Lemma 36 to arbitrary 
C-structures. 
Lemma 56. Let (D, A) be a default theory and let D contain a normal default 
without prerequisites w. Let s be a C-structure and let W be a set of s-worlds. If 
for some w E W and some tuple u of elements of US, w k p(u), then for any 
u E A;,,,,(W), u I= P(u). 
Proof. The proof follows immediately from the definition of A;D,Aj (Definition 
49). 0 
Proof of Theorem 55. The proof is similar to those of Theorems 53 and 54. Let U 
be a non-empty set and let W be a fixed point of 
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For any P E c‘ (f E C), substituting lP(x) (f(x) # x) for /3(x) in Lemma 56, we 
obtain that the assignment to P (f) is the same relation Pw (function f”) in all 
the elements of W. (Recall that all the elements of W have the same domain U.) 
Therefore, the restriction of interpretations of W to the symbols of C results in 
the same normal C-structure s (IU~ = U). That is, W is a set of normal s-worlds. 
Since W is a tixed point of 
-l:;,“; ,!‘i:,‘;‘,!‘. ,+$!;I; ,,, ( U( ?p)+‘.~* j IE(, A) 1 I 1 
the set of the belief s-worlds W satisfies the condition of Definition 49 for (D, A) 
and the set of possible normal s-worlds W. It remains to show that W is the largest 
set of the belief worlds satisfying that condition. 
Assume to the contrary that there is a set of the belief worlds V such that W 
is a proper subset of V, and V satisfies the condition of Definition 49 for (D, A) 
and the set of possible normal s-worlds W. By definition, for any 
It(x) MI-(lH. - Yf4&J E D. and any tuple u of elements of U (= U,), if a(u) E Y(Xl 
Th,_ (V). and 1/3,(u). . .l&(~)~Thi,~~(W). then Y(U) ETh,>JV). Also, since 
the assignments to the predicate and function symbols belonging to C are the 
same in all the elements of V, for any P E C and any tuple II of elements of U, if 
P(u)gTTh,_ (W), then lP(u) ETA,, and lP(U)gThr,JW), then P(u)E 
Th,,, (V). Similarly. for any f E C. any tuple u of elements of U and any u E U, if 
f(u) = rr,&Th,,, (W). then f‘(u) # u ETh,[,(V), and if f(u) # uj&ThrJW), then 
f(u) = II E Th,,( (V). It follows that the set of the belief U-worlds V satisfies the 
condition of Definition 30 for (D, A) and the set of possible U-worlds W, which 
contradicts the maximality of W. 
Conversely. let s be a normal C-structure, and let W be a fixed point of A;D,Aj. 
Let U = U,. As we saw in the proof of the “only if” part of the theorem, the set of 
the belief U-worlds W satisfies the condition of Definition 20 for 
c i DU : MlP(X) : MP(x) I { : Mf(x) # x : Mf(x) =x lP(X) - P(x) ” f(x)Sx * f(x)=x 1 > ) A PE(‘ fGC 
and the set of possible U-worlds W. The proof will be completed, if we show that 
W is the largest set of belief U-worlds satisfying that condition. 
Assume to the contrary that there is a set of the belief U-worlds V such that W 
is a proper subset of V. and V satisfies the condition of Definition 20 for the 
default theory 
c i DU :M1P(x) : MP(x) lP(X) ' P(x) I 1 : Mf(x) # x : Mf(x) = x /‘EC ” f(x) #x ’ f(x) =x I > ’ A fGC 
and the set of possible U-worlds W. Then for any P E C, any v E V and any tuple 
u of elements of U, v k P(u) if and only W k P(u). That is, V is a set of s-worlds. 
(Recall that interpretations of W are s-worlds. Therefore W k P(u) if and only if 
w k P(u) for some 1%’ E W.) Indeed, the “if” direction follows from Lemma 56 
with p being P, and the only if direction follows from Lemma 56 with p being -IP. 
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Similarly, for any f E C, any u E V, any tuple u of elements of U and any u E U, 
u /= f(u) = u if and only W k f(u) = u. By definition, for any 
G) ’ MBl(~(zj. TMB&) E D, and any tuple u of elements of U, if a(~) E ThrJV), 
and l&(u), . . . , -@,(u)$ThtJW), then y(u) E ThL,(V). That is, the set of the 
belief normal s-worlds V satisfies the condition of Definition 49 for (D, A) and the 
set of possible normal s-worlds W, which contradicts the maximality of W. 0 
Now, in view of Theorems 53 and 54 one can try to express normal C- 
extensions in terms of modified Lifschitz extensions. However this cannot be done 
straightforward, because modified Lifschitz extensions are based on interpreta- 
tions where assignments to function symbols are fixed in a very special in- 
dependent manner. One possible way to avoid such an independence is first to 
allow all the functions to vary by passing to the defining expansion of L, and then 
to fix the defining predicates of the functions belonging to C. 
Proposition 57. Let C be a set of function and predicate symbols of L. Then a set 
of sentences E is a normal C-extension for a default theory (D, A) if and only if for 
some U, E ’ is a modified Lifschitz extension for 
(Dp”{‘~~::2}“{‘~~,, $$)},,,,: 
A41Pf(X) d4Pf(X) 
lP,W ’ p,<4 
, AD U card, . 
fEC 
Proof. Let Cp=(C-{f}fEc)U{Pf}fEC. Exactly as in the proof of Proposition 
24 it can be shown that E is a normal C-extension for (D, A) if and only if EP is a 
normal CP-extension for (D’, AD). By Theorem 55 and the definition of Cp, EP is 
a normal CP-extension for (D’, AD) if and only if it is a Lifschitz extension for 
( 1 Dp" :ikhP(x) :MP(x) lP(X) ' P(x) 1 { 
” A41Pf(X) : MPf(X) 
PEC TPf(4 ' P,(x) ‘AD * I > f&C 
Now the proof follows immediately from Theorem 53. 0 
Proposition 58. Let C be a set of function and predicate symbols of L. Then a set 
of sentences E is a normal C-extension for a default theory (D, A) if and only if EP 
is a modified Lifschitz extension for 
:M1P(x) : MP(x) 
lP(X) ' P(x) 
The proof of Proposition 58 differs from that of Proposition 57 only in replacing 
the words “Theorem 53” by “Theorem 54”. We leave it to the reader. 
Proposition 60 below shows that normal C-extensions can be expressed in terms 
of modified Lifschitz extensions in a more direct manner. Namely, instead of 
passing to the defining expansion of L and fixing the defining predicates of the 
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functions belonging to C, it suffices to “define” the varied function symbols, only. 
We shall need the following generalization of Definition 23. 
Definition 59. Let C be a set of function and predicate symbols of L. Let P be a 
mapping from the set of all function symbols f of L which do not belong to C to a 
list of new predicate symbols Pf. We assume that P is one-to-one and if f is an 
n-place function symbol, then Pr is an n + l-place (defining) predicate symbol. We 
call the language LDc, obtained from L by deleting its function symbols not 
belonging to C and extending its predicate symbols with {Pf: fjZC} the (C-) 
defining expansion of L.22 For f$ C, the sentence Vx, . . . Vx,3 !xPf(x, , . . . , x,, x) 
is called a (C-) defining axiom. The set of all C-defining axioms is denoted by D,. 
For a formula 4 of L we define its translation, denoted $“, into LD,, by 
induction, as follows. Consider a sequence &, 4,) . . . of formulas over the 
language extended with the new predicate symbols, such that +,, is (6, and $i+ l
results from 4, in the following manner. If 4; does not contain function symbols 
not belonging to C, then the sequence terminates at 4i. Otherwise, let 
f(t,,. . . , t,) be the leftmost term in +i such that f$ C and all t, are variables; and 
let P(. , f(t,, . , t,l), . . .) be the atomic subformula of 4, that contains that 
term. Then +,+, is obtained from $i by replacing P(. . . , f(t,, . . . , t,), . . .) with 
3x(P& ) . , t,, , x) A P(. . , x, .)). Since the number of function symbols of &+ , 
which do not belong to C is one less than the number of those in $i, the above 
sequence must terminate. The last formula in the sequence is 4”. For a set of 
L-formulas X we define a set of L,(,-formulas Xp’ by Xp’ = {4’,-: 4 E X} and for 
a set D of defaults over L we define a set Dp’ of defaults over LDc. by 
Dp’ = 
~“,(x):MP~(x),...,MP~(x). a(x):MP,(x),...,M&(x)ED 
Y pc c-4 Y(X) 
Finally, for the first-order theory X over L, the (C-) defining expansion of X is 
a theory XDC over LDc. defined by XD’ = Xpc U D,. 
Proposition 60. Let C be a set of function and predicate symbols of L and let 
(D, A) be a default theory. Then a set of sentences E is a normal C-extension for 
(D, A) if and onZy if EP’ 1s a modified Lifschitz extension for 
:khP(x) : MP(x) 
lP(X) ' P(x) 
, AD” 
PECU{ -; 
Proof. The proof is similar to those of Propositions 57 and 58. Exactly as in the 
proof of Proposition 24 it can be shown that E is a normal C-extension for (D, A) 
if and only if EP” is a normal C-extension for (Dpc, ADC). Since C contains all the 
function symbols of L,,., by Theorem 54, E pc is a normal C-extension for 
(D”-, AD’) ‘f d 1 ‘f ‘t 1 an on y I I is a modified Lifschitz extension for 
” In particular, if C contains no function symbols, then LDc = L,, see Definition 23 
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: M-lP(x) : MP(x) 
lP(X) ' P(x) PEcu(=) 
10. Modified Lifschitz extensions and circumscription 
It is known from [9] that circumscription can be expressed in terms of normal 
extensions with fixed constants. Since, by Propositions 57, 58, and 60, normal 
extensions with fixed constants can be expressed in terms of modified Lifschitz 
extensions, circumscription can be expressed in terms of modified Lifschitz 
extensions as well. For the proofs of the expressibility results in this section we 
need to extend Definition 35 and Lemma 37 to arbitrary C-structures. 
Definition 61. Let D be a set of normal defaults without prerequisites. Let C be a 
set of function and predicate symbols and let s be a C-structure. We say that an 
s-world w is D-maximal if there is no s-world w’ such that for all w E D, 
P” c P”‘; and for some e E D, /3 w is a proper subset of p w’. We say that 
s-worlds w1 and w2 are P-equivalent, denoted w1 -D w2, if /3 w1 = /3 w2, for all 
w E D. (It immediately follows from the definition that -D is an equivalence 
relation.) 
The proof of the following lemma is similar to that of Lemma 37 and will be 
omitted. 
Lemma 62. Let C be a set of function and predicate symbols and let s be a 
C-structure. Let D be a set of normal defaults without prerequisites. A set of 
s-worlds is a fixed point of ATD,*) f i and only if it is an equivalence class of the 
restriction of -D to the D-maximal s-worlds which are models of A. 
Propositions 63-65 below are different translations of [9, Proposition 71 into 
modified Lifschitz extensions. 
Proposition 63. Let P be a set of predicate symbols, and let C be a set of function 
and predicate symbols disjoint with P. A sentence 4 is entailed by the circumscrip- 
tion of P in A(P) with the fixed constants C if and only if for all U, 4’ belongs to 
all modified Lifschitz extensions for 
, AD U card, . 
Proposition 64. Let P be a set of predicate symbols, and let C be a set of function 
and predicate symbols dkjoint with P. A sentence 4 is entailed by the circumscrip- 
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tion of P in A(P) with the fixed constants C if and only if 4’ belongs to all 
modified Lifschitz extensions for 
Proposition 65. Let P be a set of predicate symbols, and let C be a set of function 
and predicate symbols disjoint with P. A sentence 4 is entailed by the circumscrip- 
tion of P in A(P) with the fixed constants C if and only if 4”. belongs to all 
modified Lifschitz extensions for 
Proof of Proposition 63. The proof is similar to that of [9, Proposition 71. By 18, 
Proposition 11, a sentence 4 is entailed by the circumscription of P in A(P) with 
the fixed constants C if and only if it is satisfied by all P-minimal C-structures 
which are normal models of A(P). Obviously, a model of A(P) is P-minimal if 
and only if it is { w}p_. -maximal. By Lemma 62, the class of such models 
coincides with the union of all (normal) fixed points of all 
A” .MIP~ (1 +(Jj L)ptp.{AV?~) - 
where s is a C-structure, and the result follows from Proposition 57. 0 
The proof of Propositions 64 and 65 differs from that of Proposition 63 only in 
replacing the words “Proposition 57” by “Proposition 58” and “Proposition 60”, 
respectively. We leave them to the reader. 
Now the original McCarthy’s circumscription of one predicate can be very 
nicely expressed in terms of modified Lifschitz extensions. 
Proposition 66. A sentence $I is entailed by the circumscription of predicate P in 
A(P) if and only if 4 belongs to all modified Lifschitz extensions for 
: MlQ(x) : k@(x) ((:“I;g+Ji lQ(X) ’ Q(x) Id A>. 
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Proposition 65, because if C contains 
all the function and predicate symbols, but P, then ADC is A itself. 0 
In the above propositions, dealing with normal interpretations, we implicitly 
used the assumption that = does not belong to P. Indeed, by definition, = is fixed 
in normal interpretations (which are #-maximal). One of the features of our 
approach is that it allows = to vary. Thus, we can try to circumscribe equality, by 
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substituting = for P in Proposition 66. Note that for this we have first to pass to 
the defining expansion, because we cannot use equality anymore for fixing 
function symbols. Equivalently, instead of passing to the defining expansion of L, 
we may assume that L does not have function symbols. 
Let EQ(=) be the set of all the equality axioms. The “syntactical” circumscrip- 
tion of = in EQ(=) states that = is the minimal congruence relation, which also 
follows from the definition of equality without applying circumscription.23 If in 
Proposition 66 we substitute = for P, we obtain that u sentence 4 ti entailed by the 
circumscription of = if and only if 4 belongs to all modified Lifschitz extensions 
for 
or, equivalently, that 4 is satisfied by all normal interpretations. That is, 
semantically, the circumscribed equality is identity, which perfectly matches the 
intuition. Since the syntactical counterpart of satisfiability by all the normal 
interpretations is provability in the first-order predicate calculus, as we already 
know, the result of circumscription of = in EQ(=) is = itself. 
11. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we pointed out some obvious lacks of definitions of extensions for 
open default theories known from the literature, and considered a possible 
definition which is less vulnerable. This definition, basically, follows Lifschitz’s 
semantical approach [9], whereas other definitions of extensions for open default 
theories known from the literature are syntactical. In particular, whereas in 
Reiter’s and Poole’s approaches the free variables of a default are treated as 
meta-variables for closed terms, in Lifschitz’s and our approaches they are treated 
as the theory object variables. The reason for choosing semantical definition of 
extensions is that it provides a complete (but indirect) description of the theory 
objects, which in turn, implies the domain closure assumption. 
The difference between ours and Lifschitz’s original definition is the replace- 
ment of sets of normal interpretations over the same possibly finite domain by sets 
of interpretations with the same universal pre-interpretation. Whereas normal and 
universal non-normal interpretation approaches are equivalent in the case of 
closed default theories considered by Guerreiro and Casanova in [4], the 
restriction to normal interpretations implies undesirable consequences in the case 
of open default theories. In general, the restriction to normal interpretations 
seems unnatural, because, for example, equality is definable, if the underlying 
language has only finitely many predicate and function symbols. 
The second difference between Lifschitz’s and our approaches is that Lifschitz’s 
definition, requiring the assignment of identity to the equality relation, empha- 
23 The fact that circumscribing equality does not produce anything new was pointed out in [3]. 
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sizes the predicate structure of the interpretation, whereas our approach is based 
on the compatibility of the assignments to function symbols. An indirect support 
for the compatibility requirement is that the assignment to functions in the worlds 
of Kripke models for the first-order modal logics must be compatible (and can be 
assumed universal), and there is a tight relationship between closed default 
theories and nonmonotonic modal logics, see [6]. 
Finally we would like to note that the evidence for the rightness of our 
approach is only intuitive. There is no (and cannot be any) conclusive formal 
criteria for the rightness of a definition of extensions for open default theories. 
The question “which definition is the right one?” can be answered only by a field 
test. 
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